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ADMINISTRATIVE LAW SURVEY: TRANSPORTATION
INTRODUCTION
The creation of administrative agencies indicates a need for expertise in
various industries. Congress and the courts have shifted the responsibility of
governing certain sectors to agencies, which are equipped to regulate the de-
tails of those sectors and are qualified to pay particular attention to an
industry's operation.' Administrative power relieves the judicial and legisla-
tive processes of the details of regulation,2 leaving the judiciary to define and
interpret the limitations on agency power.'
While statutes and case law significantly restrict a court's ability to re-
verse agency determinations, the Federal Administrative Procedure Act
("APA")4 permits a court to overturn agency action if the reviewing court
finds the agency's conclusions to be "arbitrary and capricious,"5 or unsupport-
ed by "substantial evidence." 6 While the APA sets forth other circumstances
in which courts shall review agency action,7 "substantial evidence"' review
and "arbitrary and capricious'" review are the two standards most often used
to review agency fact-findings.' Both of these standards are highly deferen-
tial to agency decision-making," and regardless of whether the reviewing
court would have reached the same decision as the agency, the standards dic-
1. JAMES M. LANDIs, THE ADMINiSTRATIVE PROCESS 23 (1938).
2. Id. at 46.
3. See generally Robert L. Rabin, Federal Regulation in Historical Perspective, 38 STAN.
L. REV. 1189, 1194 (1986) (explaining that regulatory legislation "leav[es] an open field" for
courts to delineate the "contours of administrative power").
4. 5 U.S.C. §§ 551-559, 701-706 (1994).
5. See 5 U.S.C. § 706(2)(A) (1994) (stating that a reviewing court shall "hold unlawful and
set aside agency action, findings, and conclusions found to be ... arbitrary, capricious, an abuse
of discretion, or otherwise not in accordance with law").
6. See id. § 706(2)(E) (stating that courts shall utilize the substantial evidence test whenever
they review formal agency action in accordance with §§ 556 and 557 of the APA).
7. Id. § 706(2)(B)-(D), (F).
8. The "substantial evidence" standard was well established before the APA was enacted in
1946. See, e.g., Consolidated Edison Co. v. N.L.R.B., 305 U.S. 197, 229 (1938) (defining substan-
tial evidence as "such relevant evidence as a reasonable mind might accept as adequate to support
a conclusion").
9. Courts have struggled to define "arbitrary" and have relied on the Supreme Court's guid-
ance when employing this standard. CtiARL-Es H. KOCH JR., ADMINISTRATIVE LAW AND PRACTICE
§§ 2.34-2.41 (1985).
10. See, e.g., BERNARD SCHWARTZ, ADMINISTRATIVE LAW 597 (1984) (stating that since
1912 "the substantial evidence rule has been the touchstone for review of agency fact-findings");
Antonin Scalia & Frank Goodman, Procedural Aspects of the Consumer Product Safety Act, 20
UCLA L. REv. 899, 934 (1972-73) (stating that arbitrary and capricious review and substantial
evidence review are the two most frequently invoked statutory bases for setting aside agency
decisions).
11. For a discussion of how the Supreme Court has applied these standards, and how the
standards have evolved, see Matthew J. McGrath, Note, Convergence of the Substantial Evidence
and Arbitrary and Capricious Standards of Review During Informal Rulemaking, 54 GEO. WASH.
L. REV, 541 (1986).
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tate that the reviewing court will uphold the agency's decision if the decision
is reasonable. 2
During the 1994 survey period, 3 the Tenth Circuit applied both the "sub-
stantial evidence" and "arbitrary and capricious" standards to review agency
decision-making. This Survey focuses on the Tenth Circuit's application of
these standards in two transportation law cases. In both cases, the Tenth Cir-
cuit deferred to agency expertise.
In Board of County Commissioners v. Isaac,4 the Tenth Circuit deter-
mined that it could not review the Federal Aviation Administration's ("FAA")
decision to withdraw approval of certain funding. 5 The court concluded that
the decision was committed to the FAA, and held that the FAA's decision was
not arbitrary and capricious. 6 This Survey will question the court's "arbitrary
and capricious" review, given its holding that allocation of funding is unre-
viewable as a matter of law.
7
In Committee to Preserve Boomer Lake Park v. Department of Transpor-
tation," the Tenth Circuit deferred to the Secretary of Transportation's deci-
sion to provide federal funds for the construction of a highway. 9 Judge
Brorby, writing for the court, held that the Secretary acted within the scope of
his authority in reaching his decision, 0 and concluded that the Federal High-
way Administration's findings were not arbitrary and capricious.2'
In both Issac and Boomer Lake, the Tenth Circuit chose to defer to agen-
cy decision-making. It appears clear from these and other cases, that the Tenth
Circuit will rarely upset or overturn agency decisions.
I. WHEN A COURT CANNOT DECIDE:
JUDICIAL REVIEW VS. COMMITTED TO AGENCY ACTION:
BOARD OF CouNTY COMMISSIONERS V. IsAAc 2
A. Background
1. Judicial Review of Agency Decision-Making
Agencies are created by the legislature and are governed by the terms of
12. See generally, Lujan v. National Wildlife Fed'n, 497 U.S. 871, 885 (1990) (illustrating
that the arbitrary and capricious standard gives substantial deference to agency fact-finding); Cit-
izens to Preserve Overton Park, Inc. v. Volpe, 401 U.S. 402, 416 (1971) (explaining that the scope
of judicial review is narrow and that a court may not "substitute its judgment for that of the agen-
cy").
13. The Tenth Circuit Survey period includes cases decided from September 1993 to Decem-
ber 1994.
14. 18 F.3d 1492 (10th Cir. 1994).
15. Id. at 1498.
16. Id.
17. Id.
18. 4 F.3d 1543 (10th Cir. 1993).
19. Id. at 1550.
20. Id.
21. Id. at 1553.
22. 18 F.3d 1492 (10th Cir. 1994).
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the agency's enabling act. The agency structure differs, depending on the size
and form of the particular administration.23 An agency's functions also vary
depending on the ends that the agency pursues.24 Such functions may include:
producing public goods," transferring wealth to individuals,26 subsidizing
particular activities, 7 regulating a sector of the economy," administering a
public resource,29 establishing rules for other decision processes,30 promoting
health, safety, and social values,3 and providing internal oversight.32 Most
agencies perform a number of these tasks and it is often difficult to identify
the core function of an agency.33
While it is the legislature's prerogative to grant agencies authority to
effectuate and interpret their enabling statutes, it is the responsibility of the
judiciary to review agency decision-making.34 In reality, however, only a
small number of agency decisions are actually subject to judicial review, 3
and even fewer are in fact overturned.36
The APA's provisions concerning judicial review of agency actions37
state that any person "adversely affected" by agency action38 is entitled to
judicial review as long as the agency action is final.39 The reviewing court
"shall ... hold unlawful and set aside agency action, findings, and conclusions
found to be ... arbitrary, capricious, an abuse of discretion, or otherwise not
in accordance with law .... '0 A court, however, may not review agency ac-
tion that is committed to the agency's discretion by law.' Even in cases
where Congress has not explicitly rejected judicial review, "review is not to be
23. James v. DeLong, New Wine for a New Bottle: Judicial Review in the Regulatory State,
72 VA. L. REv. 399, 401 (1986).
24. Id.
25. Examples of goods and services include defense, highways, weather reports, air traffic
control, and criminal justice. Id. at 402.
26. These functions include programs such as welfare and social security. Id.
27. For example, farm and housing subsidies aid individuals in transferring wealth. Id.
28. This includes regulating modes of transportation, banking, energy, securities and commu-
nications. Id.
29. Agencies manage resources such as forests, oil fields, and grazing land. Id.
30. An example of government regulation in this arena is anti-fraud laws. Id. at 402-03.
31. Agencies "further important social goals that the free market may undervalue." Id.
32. Id.
33. Id. at 403-04.
34. WILLIAM F. Fox, JR., UNDERSTANDING ADMINIsTRATIVE LAW 21 (2d ed. 1992).
35. Id. at 241.
36. Id. For statistics on the number of agency decisions that are overturned by courts, see
Carl McGowan, A Reply to Judicialization, 1986 DUKE L.J. 217, 220 (1986).
37. See 5 U.S.C. §§ 701-706 (1994).
38. See id. § 702 (1994). This section of the APA, however, is limited by section 701(a). In
order for there to be judicial review of agency action, "a party must clear the hurdle of §701(a)."
Federal Deposit Ins. Corp. v. Bank of Coushatta, 930 F.2d 1122, 1127 (5th Cir. 1991) (citing
Heckler v. Chancy, 470 U.S. 821, 828 (1985)).
39. See 5 U.S.C. § 704 (1994).
40. 5 U.S.C. § 706 (1994).
41. See 5 U.S.C. § 701(a)(2) (1994). For a general discussion of section 701(a)(2)'s excep-
tions to judicial review of agency action, see Lawrence G. Baxter, Administrative and Judicial
Review of Prompt Corrective Action Decisions by the Federal Banking Regulators, 7 ADMIN. L.J.
AM. U. 505, 555-60 (1994); Charles H. Koch, Jr., An Issue-Driven Strategy for Review of Agency
Decisions, 43 ADMIN. L. REV. 511, 548-58 (1991); Ronald M. Levin, Understanding
Unreviewability in Administrative Law, 74 MINN. L. REV. 689 (1990).
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had if the statute is drawn so that a court would have no meaningful standard
against which to judge the agency's exercise of discretion." '42
In Heckler v. Chaney,43 the Supreme Court concluded that an agency's
refusal to pursue an enforcement action was "presumed immune from judicial
review under [5 U.S.C.] § 701(a)(2)."" In other words, the Court included
agency refusals to institute investigative or enforcement proceedings within the
"committed to agency discretion" exception of the APA.4'
Lower courts have struggled in applying the presumption of
unreviewability announced in Chaney.' It has been argued that Chaney has
threatened the continued reviewability of agency action and has left the lower
courts with some unanswered issues.47
Several years later, in Franklin v. Massachusetts,' the Court addressed
the issue of final agency action under section 704 of the APA 9 Franklin
involved an action against the President of the United States, the Secretary of
Commerce, Census Bureau officials, and the Clerk of the House of Represen-
tatives." The appellees claimed that the manner in which federal employees
serving overseas were counted for census purposes was erroneous.5 The Su-
preme Court, however, held that the agency's determination was unreviewable
42. Heckler v. Chancy, 470 U.S. 821, 830 (1985); see also Lincoln v. Vigil, 113 S. Ct.
2024, 2030-32 (1993) (explaining that there are circumstances when the agency can best deter-
mine its spending priorities); Webster v. Doe, 486 U.S. 592, 599-600 (1988) (holding that the
court may not review the Director of the Central Intelligence Agency's decision to discharge em-
ployees under section 701(a)(2) of the APA); United States v. Varig Airlines, 467 U.S. 797, 820
(1984) (holding that judicial intervention into the FAA's decision-making "would require the
courts to 'second-guess' the ... judgments of an agency exercising its regulatory function"); Citi-
zens to Preserve Overton Park, Inc. v. Volpe, 401 U.S. 402, 410 (1971) (demonstrating that gov-
ernmental action is reviewable except where there is a statutory prohibition on review or where
agency action is committed by law to the agency's discretion). Section 701(a)(1) and 701(a)(2)
differ in that "[slubsection (a)(1) is concerned with whether Congress expressed an intent to pro-
hibit judicial review; subsection (a)(2) applies 'in those rare instances where statutes are drawn in
such broad terms that in a given case there is no law to apply."' Webster, 486 U.S. at 599 (quot-
ing Overton Park, 401 U.S. at 410).
43. 470 U.S. 821 (1985). Chaney involved prison inmates sentenced to die by lethal injec-
tion. The inmates petitioned the Food and Drug Administration ("FDA"), arguing that the injec-
tions had not been approved for use in human executions. Id. at 823. The inmates challenged the
FDA in court when the FDA refused to act on the inmates complaint. Id. at 825. The FDA argued
that its refusal to take enforcement action was unreviewable, and the Court agreed that it could not
review the FDA's determination under section 701(a)(2) of the APA. Id. at 832.
44. Id.
45. Id. at 838.
46. See Levin, supra note 41, at 753 (noting that "lower courts reviewing agency inaction
have had to struggle with [Chaney's] manifest ambivalence"); Donald M. Levy, Jr. & Debra J.
Duncan, Note, Judicial Review of Administrative Rulemaking and Enforcement Discretion: The
Effect of a Presumption of Unreviewability, 55 GEo. WASH. L. REv. 596, 612 (1987) (noting that
appellate courts have reached inconsistent results in reviewing administrative decisions).
47. Abner J. Mikva, The Changing Role of Judicial Review, 38 ADMIN. L. REv. 115, 134-40
(1986).
48. 112 S. Ct. 2767 (1992).
49. Id. at 2773. 5 U.S.C. § 704 states that "[a]gency action made reviewable by statute and
final agency action for which there is no other adequate remedy in a court are subject to judicial
review. A preliminary, procedural, or intermediate agency action or ruling not directly reviewable
is subject to review on the review of final agency action ..... Id.




because there was no "final agency action.""
Franklin established a two-pronged test to help determine whether agency
action is final and thus subject to judicial review. The Court stated that lower
courts must determine "whether the agency has completed its decision[-]mak-
ing process, and whether the result of that process is one that will directly
affect the parties." 3 Judicial review is only appropriate when both of these
questions are answered in the affirmative. 4 Lower courts have generally
agreed with the holding and reasoning of Franklin,55 and have avoided ad-
dressing substantive claims when the two-pronged Franklin test is not satis-
fied.56
2. The Federal Aviation Act
The Federal Aviation Act was enacted in 1958."7 Under this Act, the
Secretary of Transportation (Secretary) was given authority to promulgate and
enforce regulations on all matters relating to the use of "navigable air-
space."5" The Secretary, in turn, delegated this authority to the Administrator
of the Federal Aviation Administration (FAA). 9 The FAA is thus responsible
for the "promotion, regulation, and safety of civil aviation," as well as for
securing the use of airspace. 6' Among other things, the FAA maintains air
traffic control, creates and enforces standards that govern the certification of
civilian aviators, prepares the National Plan of Integrated Airport Systems
which identifies airports eligible to receive grant-in-aid planning and develop-
ment funds, and develops airport facilities in accordance with standards it
establishes.
62
Throughout the 1960s, the number of aircraft in the United States rapidly
accelerated, motivating the federal government to increase funding for air-
52. Id. at 2773.
53. Id.
54. Id. at 2774.
55. Cohen v. Rice, 992 F.2d 376, 381 (1st Cir. 1993); see also Public Citizen v. United
States Trade Representative, 5 F.3d 549, 551 (D.C. Cir. 1993) (discussing the "core question" of
agency action requirement from Franklin); Charles E. Smith Management, Inc. v. Aspin, 855 F.
Supp 852, 857 (E.D. Va. 1994) (employing Franklin's two-pronged analysis of agency action).
56. Cohen, 992 F.2d at 377. For a discussion of Franklin and the consequences of its
holding, see Bernard Schwartz, Administrative Law Cases During 1992, 45 ADMIN. L. REV. 261,
266-68 (1993).
57. 49 U.S.C. app. §§ 1301-1557 (1988 & Supp. V 1993).
58. 49 U.S.C. app. § 1348(a). 49 U.S.C. app. § 1301(29) defines "navigable airspace" as
"airspace above the minimum altitudes of flight prescribed by regulations... includ[ing] airspace
needed to insure safety in take-off and landing of aircraft."
59. 49 C.F.R. § 1.47 (1994). The FAA superseded the Federal Aviation Agency under the
Department of Transportation Act of 1966. JOHN R. WILEY, AIRPORT ADMINISTRATION AND
MANAGEMENT 11 (1986). When the Department of Transportation Act was enacted, "[a] major
reshuffling of aviation agencies took place." ROBERT M. HARDAWAY, AIRPORT REGULATION, LAW
AND PUBLIC POLICY 19 (1991). In addition to the Federal Aviation Agency becoming the Federal
Aviation Administration, certain responsibilities of the Civil Aeronautics Board ("CAB") were
transferred first to the Department of Transportation and then to the National Transportation Safety
Board ("NTSB"). Id. For more information on the CAB and the NTSB see id. at 13-16, 19, 21.
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ports.63 The FAA was charged with administering the Airport and Airways
Trust Fund. ' The Trust Fund derives its proceeds from domestic air passen-
ger ticket taxes, air cargo, and aviation fuel taxes.65 Monies are allocated
from the Fund for airport development and improvement, helping to reduce
general congressional appropriation.'
In the past few decades, building new airports has become less of an
option than developing and enhancing existing ones.6 7 The lack of accessible
land, and Congress's hesitation to distribute capital from the Airport Trust
Fund, are just a few of the reasons why only one major airport is presently
planned in the United States for the rest of the century.' Environmental con-
siderations such as aircraft noise, traffic flow to and from airports, and the
smell of aircraft fuel, have also been an issue in airport projects.' When the
National Environmental Policy Act ("NEPA") passed,7 environmental issues
were given primary attention in airport planning.71 These reasons, taken to-
gether, may account for the fact that Dia has been the only major airport built
in the United States since 1974.72
63. See HARDAWAY, supra note 59, at 19.
64. 26 U.S.C. § 9502 (1988 & Supp. V 1993).
65. See id. § 9502(b).
66. See id. § 9502(d) (stating that "[a]mounts in the Airport and Airway Trust Fund shall be
available ... for making expenditures... to meet those obligations of the United States...
which are attributable to planning, research and development, construction, or operation and main-
tenance of---(i) air traffic control, (ii) air navigation, (iii) communications, or (iv) supporting ser-
vices, for the airway system"); see also HARDAWAY, supra note 59, at 19-20. While the Fund was
established to finance airport development projects, at least one critic has argued that "the fund is
used as an accounting gimmick to artificially balance the [federal] budget." Pat Schroeder,
Colorado's New Airport Beginning to Take Wing, ROCKY MTN. NEWS, Sept. 29, 1989, at 65.
67. Robert Hardaway, Economics of Airport.Regulation, 20 TRANsP. L.J. 47, 52 (1991).
68. Id. That airport, the Denver International Airport, was scheduled to open back in 1993.
Ann Carnahan, 3,000 Gather to Celebrate Start of Work on Airport, ROCKY MTN. NEWS, Nov. 23,
1989, at 8. However, since 1993, DIA was forced to postpone the opening four times. Business
Aviation Briefs; Denver International Airport, WKLY. BUS. AVIATION (McGraw-Hill, Inc., New
York, N.Y.), Sept. 26, 1994, Vol. 59, No. 13. DIA did not open until February 28, beginning
operations 16 months late and $3 billion over budget. Stephen J. Hedges et al., A Taj Mahal in the
Rockies, U.S. NEWS & WORLD REPORT, Feb. 13, 1995, at 48.
69. See HARDAWAY, supra note 59, at 63; Wiley, supra note 59, at 125; see also MICHAEL
J. MESHENBERG, PLANNING THE AIRPORT ENViRONMENT 5, 7 (1968) (explaining that "noise is the
most pervasive of the environmental effects of airports" and that jet emissions may cause con-
cern).
70. 42 U.S.C. §§ 4321-4370 (1988 & Supp. V 1993). In NEPA, Congress declared:
[Ilt is the continuing policy of the Federal Government ... to use all practicable means
and measures, including financial and technical assistance, in a manner calculated to
foster and promote the general welfare, to create and maintain conditions under which
man and nature can exist in productive harmony, and to fulfill the social, economic, and
other requirements of present and future generations of Americans.
Id. § 4331(a) (1988).
NEPA requires federal agencies to prepare a detailed statement on the environmental im-
pact ("EIS") of all major federal actions that will significantly affect the quality of the human
environment. Id. § 4332(2)(C) (1988). Thus, airport planners must prepare an environmental as-
sessment ("EA") in order to determine whether an EIS is necessary. C.A.R.E. NOW, Inc. v. FAA,
844 F.2d 1569, 1571-72 (11th Cir. 1988).
For an account of how NEPA has affected administrative law, see Robert L. Rabin, Federal
Regulation in Historical Perspective, 38 STAN. L. REV. 1189, 1284-88 (1986).
71. See generally HARDAWAY, supra note 59, at 74-75 (explaining that environmental issues
were of paramount influence in the 1970s).
72. Denver International Airport was the first major airport built since Dallas/Ft. Worth
[Vol. 72:3
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B. Tenth Circuit Opinion: Board of County Commissioners v. Isaac
1. Facts
In February of 1995, the city of Denver replaced Stapleton International
Airport with a new airport ten miles northeast of Stapleton.73 As a result, car-
go carriers operating out of Stapleton were forced to relocate in order to con-
tinue their businesses.74 Several carriers disapproved of and rejected the new
site, Denver International Airport, because it did not provide the carriers with
acceptable access to interstate highways.75
In 1991, Adams County, the Front Range Airport Authority ("FRAA"),
and Centerport International, Inc., presented an offer to the FAA to expand a
nearby aviation facility, Front Range Airport ("Front Range"), into an air
cargo hub as an alternative to DIA."6 Early in 1992, the FAA authorized the
proposal,77 and allocated $15 million under the Airport Improvement Pro-
gram78 to expand the facilities to serve mass air cargo traffic anticipated in
the Denver metropolitan area.79 Subject to certain revisions and bids from
cargo carriers, the FAA informed the parties that it would allocate funds for
fiscal year 1992. However, the FAA made no commitment to provide funds
beyond 1992.80
Following FAA approval of FRAA's proposal and prospective granting of
financial support, FRAA began soliciting cargo carriers to sign long-term lease
options." FRAA was successful in obtaining a small number of lease agree-
ments while several companies expressed interest in the Front Range alter-
native providing the FAA committed to continual funding for the expansion.82
FRAA then submitted applications for funding to the FAA.83
International Airport, which opened in 1974. Paul Stephen Dempsey, The State of the Airline,
Airport & Aviation Industries, 21 TRANsp. L.J. 129, 168 (1992).
73. In late September of 1989, then Transportation Secretary Samuel Skinner furnished the
city of Denver with a check for $60 million to begin construction on a new Denver regional air-
port project. Leslie Cowling & Suzanne Weiss, Denver Gets 60 Million Check Federal Grant
Goes for Airport; Some Construction Begins Today, ROCKY MTN. NEWS, Sept. 28, 1989, at 6.
74. Board of County Comm'rs v. Isaac, 18 F.3d 1492, 1494 (10th Cir. 1994).
75. DIA's prospective cargo facilities were located at the airport's northern end, which carri-
ers felt was inadequate. Id. at 1494.
76. Given DIA's inadequate facilities and Front Range's relatively close proximity to DIA,
the parties thought this would provide a good alternative to the DIA site. Id.
77. The proposal was approved in the FAA's Record of Decision ("ROD"). Id.
78. Congress passed the Airport Improvement Program in 1982 to expand and improve the
already existing Airport Development Aid Program ("ADAP"). WILEY, supra, note 59, at 123. See
generally HARDAWAY, supra note 59, at 19-21 (giving an overview of airport and airway Acts).
The Development Aid Program afforded support in terms of financial aid, hardware acquisition,
and research and development. WILEY, supra, note 59, at 11.
79. Isaac, 18 F.3d at 1495.
80. The funding was allocated to Adams County and the FRAA, subject to revision after
bids had been opened. Id.
81. Id.
82. In April of 1992, United Parcel Service and Federal Express were two major carriers
who signed lease agreements with Front Range rather than DIA. At that time, a small number of
secondary carriers also signed letters of intent to commit to Front Range. Steve Caulk, Fedex
Delivers Front Range Lease: Small Airport Becoming A Cargo Hub with Second Major Signing,
ROCKY MTN. NEWS, Apr. 9, 1992, at 52.
83. Isaac, 18 F.3d at 1495.
1995]
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In August 1992, DIA requested FAA approval of cargo facilities on the
southern end of the airport designed to give carriers ready access to interstate
highways. 4 The FAA approved of DIA's decision to change the location of
its cargo site, and as a result, carriers which had signed with Front Range
abandoned their leases and entered into lease agreements with DIA.85 The
FAA withdrew their approval of the Front Range expansion," concluding the
changed circumstances had diminished "the previously perceived need for the
Front Range expansion."87 Shortly thereafter, the FAA endorsed DIA's south-
ern end cargo facilities. 8 The Adams County Board of Commissioners and
other interested parties appealed the FAA's decision to the Tenth Circuit.89
They sought nullification of the FAA's reversal order and reinstatement of the
funding for the Front Range expansion project."
2. Opinion of the Court
In Board of County Commissioners v. Isaac,"' the petitioners argued that
the FAA had acted arbitrarily and capriciously because the reversal order was
not supported by substantial evidence as required by 49 U.S.C. app. §
1486(e),92 5 U.S.C. § 706(2)(A), and 5 U.S.C. § 706(2)(E).93 In support of
this argument, the petitioners noted that the FAA failed to consider such attrib-
utes as Front Range's convenient transportation routes, prudent and competi-
tive expansion/operating costs, investment opportunities, and long-term leases
and assurances from cargo carriers that they would establish themselves at
Front Range pending FAA funding.94 Because the FAA declined to take these
and other factors into account,95 the petitioners claimed that the FAA had
84. Id.
85. One such carrier was Federal Express. United Parcel Service was the only carrier who
ended up signing with the FRAA. Id.
86. There was no longer a "purpose and need" for the Front Range project given "the via-
bility of DIA as an alternative for air cargo operations." Id.
87. Id.
88. The FAA regional administrator concluded that the FAA's commitment to FRAA had
been "contingent upon relocation... [at] DIA... for cargo operations from the north to the
south side of the airport." Id.
89. See 49 U.S.C. app. § 1486(a) (1988 & Supp. V 1993) (stating that "[a]ny order...
issued by the Board or Secretary of Transportation... shall be subject to review by the courts of
appeals of the United States").
90. Isaac, 18 F.3d at 1495. Petitioners also brought a conflict claim "to justify the reinstate-
ment of the original ROD and contend[ed] the FAA should be estopped from denying the money
it initially promised." Id. Petitioner's charged that the FAA was aware of a conflict of interest
stemming from FAA staff members' personal involvement in the Front Range and DIA projects.
Id. at 1499. The petitioners claimed that this conflict of interest was left unresolved. Id.
91. 18 F.3d 1492 (10th Cir. 1994).
92. See 49 U.S.C. app. § 1486(e) (stating that "[tihe findings of facts by the Board or Secre-
tary of Transportation, if supported by substantial evidence, shall be conclusive").
93. See 5 U.S.C. § 706(2)(A), 706(2)(E) (stating that a reviewing court shall "hold unlawful
and set aside agency action, findings, and conclusions found to be ... arbitrary, capricious, an
abuse of discretion, or otherwise not in accordance with law; ... [or] unsupported by substantial
evidence").
94. Isaac, 18 F.3d at 1495-96.
95. Petitioners also argued that the FAA played favorites instead of remaining neutral (the




acted arbitrarily and capriciously, resulting in a clear error of judgment."
The Tenth Circuit exercised jurisdiction pursuant to 49 U.S.C. app. §
1486(a),97 and affirmed the FAA's decision." Upon review, the court con-
sidered whether the FAA, in making their final determination, had given cre-
dence to all of the pertinent factors. 99 Concluding that there was no apparent
error of judgment, the court determined that the FAA's decision was not arbi-
trary and capricious."° Judge Moore emphasized that the FAA's initial sup-
port for the Front Range project was based on the presumption that "DIA was
not a viable alternative to the expansion of Front Range . ".. " 'Since there
were substantial changes in DIA's economic viability after it switched its
cargo location,"° the Tenth Circuit ruled that the FAA was justified in later
disapproving of FRAA's expansion. 3
The Isaac court went on to determine that it could not review the FAA's
decision to withdraw its tentative funding for the Front Range expansion."°
The court read the language of 49 U.S.C. app. § 1349 to provide the court
with no "justiciable standard of review,"'' 5 as "[tihe allocation of funds from
a lump-sum appropriation is ... traditionally regarded as committed to agency
discretion."" Because an agency can best determine its spending
priorities, 7 agencies have the flexibility to manage appropriations." s As
long as the agency's allocation "meets permissible statutory objections," a
court may not review the-agency's expenditure." 9
The Federal Aviation Act forbids judicial review "where objections were
not first presented to the 'Board or Secretary of Transportation' unless 'rea-
sonable grounds' excuse the failure to appeal to the agency.""'  Petitioners
96. Id.
97. For the text of section 1486(a), see supra note 90.
98. Isaac, 18 F.3d at 1494.
99. Id. at 1497-98. The court considered the entire agency record in accordance with the
"substantial evidence" standard of section 706(2)(E). Judge Moore explained that this standard
required the FAA to have a "rational basis for drawing its conclusions from the facts." Id. at 1496
(citing City of Pompano Beach v. FAA, 744 F.2d 1529, 1540 (1 1th Cir. 1985)).
100. Id. at 1498.
101. Id. at 1497. In the FAA's original Record of Decision, the FAA determined that DIA
was "'not as economical, efficient, and air cargo-oriented as Front Range Airport .... ' Id. This
was due to such considerations as DIA's potentially high costs and inadequate ground
transportation connections, long taxi distances and absence of low-priced land for private develop-
ment. Id.
102. Id. at 1498.
103. Id. The court explained that various cargo carriers did attempt to persuade DIA to relo-
cate its cargo site, despite their support for the Front Range project. It was therefore appropriate
for the FAA to consider DIA's response to these efforts in determining the location of the Denver
air cargo hub. Id. at 1497.
104. Id. at 1498.
105. Id. The court determined that the allocation of funds from a government appropriation is
a determination better suited to an administrative agency. Id.
106. Id. (citing Lincoln v. Vigil, 113 S. Ct. 2024, 2031 (1993)).
107. Heckler, 470 U.S. at 831-32.
108. Vigil, 113 S. Ct. at 2031-32.
109. Isaac, 18 F.3d at 1498 (citing Vigil, 113 S. Ct. at 2032); see also International Union v.
Donovan, 746 F.2d 855, 863 (D.C. Cir. 1984) (explaining that the court has no jurisdiction to
review lump sum allocation of funds).
110. Id. at 1499 (citing 49 U.S.C. app. § 1486(e)). Section 1486(e) states:
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failed to bring their conflict claim before the FAA and therefore it was within
the court's discretion to exercise review regarding the issue." The court
concluded "[m]eaningful review is not possible... " and did not consider the
matter."
2
In response to the petitioners' claim asserting equitable estoppel, Judge
Moore found no intentional misrepresentation or concealment by the FAA."3
The Tenth Circuit based its finding on the fact that the FAA had conditioned
funding for the Front Range expansion upon "factors ultimately left unsatis-
fied.""' 4 The court determined that this did not constitute affirmative miscon-
duct." 5 Moreover, claiming "equitable estoppel against the government is an
extraordinary remedy.""' 6 Judge Moore noted that an assertion of equitable
estoppel against the government has yet to be upheld by the Supreme
Court.' ',
3. Analysis
Much of the Isaac opinion focused on the two standards most often used
to review agency action."' The court first discussed the "substantial evi-
dence" standard."9 After stating that substantial evidence meant "more than
a mere scintilla but less than the weight of the evidence,"'"2 the court exam-
ined the record, in its entirety, under that standard.' 2' Next, the court exam-
ined the "arbitrary and capricious" standard and applied it to the facts.
2
Judge Moore noted that an agency acts arbitrarily and capriciously when "it
relie[s] on factors deemed irrelevant by Congress, fail[s] to consider important
aspects of the problem, [or] present[s] an implausible explanation or one con-
trary to the evidence.' 23
In Part H of the opinion, however, the court determined that the FAA's
decision to withdraw its tentative funding was not reviewable. 24 This deter-
mination should have precluded any discussion of the merits of the case.'2 5
The findings of facts by the Board or Secretary of Transportation, if supported by sub-
stantial evidence, shall be conclusive. No objection to an order of the Board or Secretary
of Transportation shall be considered by the court unless such objection shall have been
urged before the Board or Secretary of Transportation or, if it was not so urged, unless
there were reasonable grounds for failure to do so.
49 U.S.C. app. § 1486(e) (1988 & Supp. V 1993).
111. Isaac, 18 F.3d at 1498 (citing Park County Resource Council, Inc. v. United States Dep't
of Agric., 817 F.2d 609, 619 (10th Cir. 1987)).
112. Id.
113. Id. at 1499.
114. Id.
115. Id.
116. Id. at 1498 (citing Office of Personnel Management v. Richmond, 496 U.S. 414, 421-22
(1990)).
117. Id. at 1498-99.
118. Id. at 1496-98.
119. Id. at 1496.
120. Id.
121. Id. (citing City of Pompano Beach v. FAA, 744 F.2d 1529, 1539 (11th Cir. 1985)).
122. Id. at 1496-98.
123. Id. at 1497 (citing Quivira Mining Co. v. United States Regulatory Comm'n, 866 F.2d
1246, 1249 (10th Cir. 1989)).
124. Id. at 1498.
125. Id. at 1496. It has been said that no review means no review, for the APA cannot effect
[Vol. 72:3
ADMINISTRATIVE LAW: TRANSPORTATION
Indeed, the Supreme Court has found that section 701(a)(2) of the APA gives
the court no leave to intrude when an agency is allocating funds.'26 More-
over, the Supreme Court has held that it is error for a court to review the
merits of a claim when governmental action is not reviewable under the Ad-
ministrative Procedure Act.' Logically, the same reasoning should have ap-
plied in Issac.2 s
The doctrine of unreviewability has been controversial since the Supreme
Court's decision in Heckler v. Chaney,'29 and the Tenth Circuit may have
been motivated to discuss Issac on its merits in order to dissipate the apparent
conflict between sections 701, 702 and 706 of the Administrative Procedure
Act. Given the presumption of reviewability under section 702, and section
706's judicial review provision for an agency's abuse of discretion, the Issac
court's examination of the FAA's determination acts to assuage petitioner's
concerns of the validity of the FAA's order.30
The Tenth Circuit's holding reinforces the conclusion that courts may not
exercise jurisdiction to review the allocation of agency funds.'3' While it was
probably unnecessary for the court to examine the record to determine whether
the FAA's decision was arbitrary and capricious, 3 2 the examination may
well have been warranted given the Supreme Court's conviction that the
"committed to agency discretion" exception remain a very narrow one.'33
"something to which it does not apply." Kenneth C. Davis, Administrative Arbitrariness Is Not
Always Reviewable, 51 MINN. L. REv. 643, 644 (1967).
126. Vigil, 113 S. Ct. at 2032.
127. See Franklin v. Massachusetts, 112 S. Ct. 2767, 2776 (1992) (holding the District Court
erred in determining the merits of an APA claim when the governmental actions at issue were
unreviewable under the APA).
128. Access to the courts is not permitted where there is no means for the court to review an
action. See Abbott Lab. v. Gardner, 387 U.S. 136, 153 (1967). While the rationale underlying
Franklin stems from agency finality and § 704 of the APA, the same result can be extended to
reach § 702; if the APA does not permit review of an agency's actions, those actions are not re-
viewable for abuse of discretion. Franklin, 112 S. Ct. at 2775-76.
129. See Cass R. Sunstein, Reviewing Agency Inaction After Heckler v. Chaney, 52 U. CHI. L.
REv. 653 (1985); see also Sharon Werner, Note, The Impact of Heckler v. Chancy on Judicial Re-
view of Agency Decisions, 86 COLUM. L. REv. 1247, 1248-49 (explaining that section 701(a)(2)
has been the subject of confusion and controversy).
130. Some say judicial review should be guaranteed to test whether the agency has abused its
discretion. Louis L. JAFFE, JUDICIAL CONTROL OF ADMINISTRATIVE ACnON 359 (1965). For a
discussion on the conflict between §§ 701(a)(2) and 706(2)(a) of the APA, see Daniel B. Rodri-
guez, The Presumption of Reviewability: A Study in Canonical Construction and its Consequenc-
es, 45 VAND. L. REv. 743, 756 (1992).
131. Isaac, 18 F.3d at 1498.
132. Id. at 1496-97.
133. See Overton Park, 401 U.S. at 410. The Court noted that section 701 had been the sub-
ject of extensive commentary. Id. at 410 n.23.
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II. HIGHWAY DECISION-MAKING AND DEFERENCE TO AGENCY ACTION:
COMMITTEE TO PRESERVE BOOMER LAKE PARK V. DEPARTMENT OF
TRANSPORTATION'3 4
A. Background
There is a national policy to safeguard the unaffected beauty of public
park and recreation lands.'35 Section 138 of the Federal-Aid Highway Act of
1968 ("FHA"),36 and section 4(f) of the Department of Transportation Act
of 1966 ("DTA"),'37 forbid the use of parkland for highway purposes unless
there is no feasible and prudent alternative. 38 Thus, the Secretary of Trans-
134. 4 F.3d 1543 (10th Cir. 1993).
135. See 23 U.S.C. § 138 (1988 & Supp. V 1993). That section states in pertinent part:
It is hereby declared to be the national policy that special effort should be made to pre-
serve the natural beauty of the countryside and public park and recreation lands, wildlife
and waterfowl refuges, and historic sites. The Secretary of Transportation shall cooperate
and consult with the Secretaries of the Interior, Housing and Urban Development, and
Agriculture, and with the States in developing transportation plans and programs that
include measures to maintain or enhance the natural beauty of the lands traversed....
[T]he Secretary shall not approve any program or project.., which requires the use of
any publicly owned land from a public park, recreation area, or wildlife and waterfowl
refuge of national, State, or local significance ... unless (1) there is no feasible and
prudent alternative to the use of such land, and (2) such program includes all possible
planning to minimize harm to such park, recreation area, wildlife and waterfowl refuge,
or historic site resulting from such use....
Id.
136. Id.
137. 49 U.S.C. § 303 (1988 & Supp. V 1993). For a discussion on the implications section
4(f) has had on case law and on judicial interpretations of that section, see Barbara Miller, Com-
ment, Department of Transportation's Section 4(f): Paving the Way Toward Preservation, 36 AM.
U. L. REv. 633 (1987).
138. Section 4(f) states in relevant part:
(a) It is the policy of the United States Government that special effort should be made to
preserve the natural beauty of the country-side and public park and recreation lands,
wildlife, waterfowl refuges, and historic sites.
(c) The Secretary may approve a transportation program or project (other than any pro-
ject for a park road or parkway under section 204 of title 23) requiring the use of pub-
licly owned land of a public park, recreation area, or wildlife and waterfowl refuge of
national, State, or local significance, or land of an historic site of national, State, or local
significance (as determined by the Federal, State, or local officials having jurisdiction
over the park, area, refuge, or site) only if-
(1) there is no feasible and prudent alternative to using that land; and
(2) the program or project includes all possible planning to minimize harm to
the park, recreational area, wildlife and waterfowl refuge, or historic site re-
sulting from the use.
49 U.S.C. § 303.
Section 138 of the Federal-Aid Highway Act adds:
[iln carrying out the national policy ... the Secretary [of Transportation] ... is autho-
rized to conduct studies as to the most feasible Federal-aid routes for the movement of
motor vehicular traffic trough or around national parks so as to best serve the needs of
the traveling public while preserving the natural beauty of these areas.
23 U.S.C. § 138.
Section 138 of the Federal Highway Act and section 4(f) of the Department of Transporta-
tion Act are so similar that courts often simply refer to section 4(f). See, e.g., Overton Park, 401
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portation may approve the use of federal funds'39 to finance construction of
highways'4 through public parks only when "alternative routes reach ex-
traordinary magnitudes or... present 'unique problems." ' 4' If no alternative
route is reasonable, the Secretary may approve and finance construction only
in the event that highway construction considers "all possible planning to
minimize harm to the park."'42
In making this determination, the Secretary must take into account options
that do not also effect the parkland. 43 If the alternative route uses even a
small amount of protected area, section 4(f) is triggered.'"
In 1971, the Supreme Court handed down the seminal Overton Park45
decision. The decision is prominent for a number of reasons," and clarified
U.S. at 411 (explaining that the two sections are "clear and specific directives"); Eagle Founda-
tion, Inc. v. Dole, 813 F.2d 798, 800 n.1 (7th Cir. 1987) (stating that section 138 does not "add
anything to § 4(f)").
139. Federal funds for highway expenditures have declined since the 1980s. The Federal share
of capital outlay was at its peak in the early 1980s, accounting for approximately 56 percent of the
funds that finance highways across the United States. Since then, federal funding has accounted
for 40 to 56 percent of highway financing. Report of the Secretary of Transportation to the United
States Congress, The Status of the Nations Highways, Bridges, & Transit: Conditions & Perfor-
mance, 68, 69 (1993).
140. For a discussion of the planning of federally funded highways and the basic federal-aid
highway process, see Edward V.A. Kussy, Environmental Considerations in Highway Planning,
C933 ALI-ABA 257 (1994).
141. Druid Hills Civic Ass'n, Inc. v. Federal Highway Admin., 772 F.2d 700, 715 (lth Cir.
1985) (quoting Overton Park, 401 U.S. at 411), cert. denied, 488 U.S. 819 (1988); see also Mon-
roe County Conservation Council, Inc. v. Volpe, 472 F.2d 693, 700 (2d Cir. 1972) (stating that a
"feasible alternative route is one that is compatible with sound engineering") (citing Overton Park,
401 U.S. at 411). The Monroe County court then stated, "a prudent alternative route is one that
does not present unique problems, that is, an alternative without truly unusual factors so that the
cost or community disruption would reach extraordinary magnitudes .... " Id. (citing Overton
Park, 401 U.S. at 412-13).
Prior to construction of a federal highway, the Federal Highway Administration is responsi-
ble for making sure the project complies with NEPA, which entails preparing an environmental
impact statement ("EIS"). The EIS must "balance the environmental impacts and the benefits of
the alternatives and select a preferred alternative." UNITED STATES GENERAL ACCOUNTING OF-
FICE, HIGHWAY PLANNING 2 (1994).
142. Overton Park, 401 U.S. at 411 (citing 23 U.S.C. § 138 and 49 U.S.C. § 303); see also
Stop H-3 Ass'n v. Lewis, 538 F. Supp. 149, 183 (1982) (explaining that the record must show
that "all possible measures have been taken to minimize harm") (emphasis added); Monroe Coun-
ty, 472 F.2d at 700 (stating that a "road must not take parkland, unless a prudent person, con-
cerned with the quality of the human environment is convinced that there is no way to avoid
doing so").
143. Druid Hills, 772 F.2d at 715.
144. See Louisiana Envtl. Soc'y, Inc. v. Coleman, 537 F.2d 79, 83-85 (5th Cir. 1976) (stating
that section 4(f) "is applicable whenever parkland will be 'used for a highway project"') (emphasis
added).
145. Citizens to Preserve Overton Park, Inc. v. Volpe, 401 U.S. 402 (1971).
146. Overton Park is often cited for its contribution to our understanding of section 706 of
the APA and the Court's determination that a reviewing court is required to make a thorough
examination of the agency's entire record. This has become known as the "hard-look" doctrine. As
the Overton Park Court explained, the reviewing court's inquiry has to be "thorough [and] prob-
ing ..... Id. at 415. In other words, courts must take a "searching and careful" look at the agen-
cy record. Id. at 416; see also Peter L. Strauss, Revisiting Overton Park: Political & Judicial
Controls over Administrative Actions Affecting the Community, 39 UCLA L. REV. 1251, 1261
(1992) (noting that Overton Park is the most frequently cited case in Administrative Law);
Suzannah T. French, Comment, Judicial Review of the Administrative Record in NEPA Litigation,
81 CAL. L. REv. 929, 940-41 (1993) (stating that Overton Park is known for establishing the
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the requirements of highway planners and courts reviewing the Secretary of
Transportation's actions. 47 The language of the FHA and the DTA was in-
terpreted loosely until Overton Park was decided." Prior to 1971, the law
did not require rigorous scrutiny of possible alternatives, nor did it require less
damaging alternatives be chosen. 49 Overton Park made clear that Congress
enacted section 4(f) of the Department of Transportation Act,'50 and section
18(a) of the Federal-Aid Highway Act, 5' to protect the "quality of our natu-
ral environment" and to "curb the accelerating destruction of our country's
natural beauty."''
The Overton Park Court set forth a test that required courts to take a
"hard look"'53 at the Department of Transportation's determination.'54 This
test consists of a three-tiered analysis that now provides courts with a stringent
evaluation in section 4(f) challenges. 5 In the aftermath of Overton Park,
federal highway decision-making has no longer been fashioned "on a least-
cost, political, and unreviewable basis."'5 6 Rather, the 4(f) standard has be-
come a hard edged tool for preserving our nation's rustic surroundings."'
"hard-look" doctrine).
147. See, e.g., Eagle Foundation, Inc. v. Dole, 813 F.2d 798, 800 (1987) (stating that the
court and highway planners are guided by Overton Park); Druid Hills, 772 F.2d at 714 (conduct-
ing review under Overton Park analysis); Stop H-3, 538 F. Supp. at 159 (following the standard
set forth in Overton Park).
148. See generally Oliver A. Houck, The Secret Opinions of the United States Supreme Court
on Leading Cases in Environmental Law, Never Before Published!, 65 U. COLO. L. REv. 459,
477-85 (1994) (noting that prior to Overton Park section 4(f) "did not require that urban parks be
spared" and apparently only required that "the Secretary of Transportation decide whether saving
park land really merited alternative routes"). For insight into Justice Marshall's Overton Park
opinion, see Jonathan Weinberg, Thurgood Marshall and the Administrative State, 38 WAYNE L.
REV. 115 (1991).
149. Houck, supra note 148, at 479.
150. See supra note 138 and accompanying text.
151. See supra notes 135-38 and accompanying text.
152. Overton Park, 401 U.S. at 404.
153. See supra note 146.
154. Overton Park, 401 U.S. at 415-17.
155. Id. The first prong of the test explains:
The court is first required to decide whether the Secretary acted within the scope of his
authority [under section 4(f)].... The reviewing court must consider whether the Secre-
tary properly construed his authority to approve the use of parkland as limited to situa-
tions where there are no feasible alternative routes or where feasible alternative routes
involve uniquely difficult problems. And the reviewing court must be able to find that
the Secretary could have reasonably believed that in this case there are no feasible alter-
natives of that alternatives do not involve unique problems.
Id. at 415-16.
The second and third Overton Park inquiries involve determining whether
[T]he actual choice made [by the Secretary] was not 'arbitrary, capricious, an abuse of
discretion or otherwise not in accordance with law.' To make this finding the court must
consider whether the decision was based on a consideration of the relevant factors and
whether there has been a clear error of judgment .... The final inquiry is whether the
Secretary's action followed the necessary procedural requirements.
Id. at 416-17 (citations omitted).
156. Houck, supra note 148, at 482.
157. See id. at 483 (stating that "[t]he effects of the Overton Park decision transcend highway
decision-making and transportation law"); Melissa A. MacGill, Comment, Old Stuff is Good Stuff.
Federal Agency Responsibilities Under Section 106 of the National Historic Preservation Act, 7
ADM N. L.J. AM. U. 697, 722 (1994) (noting that "[i]nstead of raising mere procedural hurdles,
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B. Tenth Circuit Opinion
1. Committee to Preserve Boomer Lake Park v. Department of
Transportation"'
a. Facts
One of the main issues in Boomer Lake was whether the Federal Highway
Administration's decision to fund a four-lane highway through Boomer Lake
Park in Stillwater, Oklahoma violated section 4(f) of the Department of Trans-
portation Act.'59 After making a preliminary determination that the Secretary
of Transportation had acted within the scope of his authority,"w the Boomer
court had to decide whether the Secretary's decision to fund the highway was
founded on a "'consideration of the relevant factors,"""' and whether the
Secretary had abused his discretion in making his decision.'62
In 1988, the Oklahoma Department of Transportation ("ODOT") sought
federal assistance from the Federal Highway Administration ("FHWA") to
reconstruct a two-lane road (Lakeview Road) that had previously cut through
the southern portion of Boomer Lake Dam,'63 which was located on Boomer
Lake." When the dam was reconstructed in the late 1970s,'65 the segment
of Lakeview Road which had run on top of the dam was destroyed and not
replaced.' t
The City of Stillwater decided to erect a new Lakeview Road across
Boomer Lake. 6 7 The City Commission planned to expand Lakeview into
four-lanes, supplanting that section of the road which had been obliterated
with the old dam.t' A cost analysis was administered and the City voted in
favor of a straight alignment across Boomer Lake."e The City's project was
regarded as "a vital part" of the city's transportation efforts. 70
Initially, the FHWA rejected ODOT's request for federal funds, 7' con-
section 4(f) imposes a clear and affirmative duty upon the DOT to minimize harm to historic
sites").
158. 4 F.3d 1543 (10th Cir. 1993).
159. Id. at 1547.
160. To determine this, the court followed the first inquiry of the three-pronged Overton Park
analysis. See supra note 156.
161. Boomer Lake, 4 F.3d at 1547 (quoting Overton Park, 401 U.S. at 416).
162. Id.
163. id. at 1548.
164. Boomer Lake made up approximately 220 acres of Stillwater, Oklahoma's 347-acre
Boomer Lake Park. Id. at 1547.
165. The dam had been inspected in 1978, and at that time it was discovered that it was
compositionally flawed and needed to be rebuilt. Id.
166. The road was not replaced "due to concerns that traffic would cause structural stress to
the new dam ..... Id.
167. Id. The road was to be built on a raised causeway and bridge and would "eliminate
congestion and accommodate present and projected traffic needs by providing a major east-west
arterial route through the city." Id.
168. Id.
169. Id. at 1547-48.
170. Id. Other factors such as traffic safety and fire department response times were taken into
consideration in the City's proposal. Id. at 1547.
171. Id. at 1548.
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cluding that the ODOT had failed to consider whether the new Lakeview Road
could have been built around Boomer Lake (instead of straight across it).'72
Additionally, ODOT failed to consider the idea of simply not building the
road.13 ODOT responded by submitting a second draft to the FHWA. This
draft included three alternative projects: "(1) a no-build alternative; (2) a four-
lane road with a straight alignment across Boomer Lake built upon a causeway
and bridge (the causeway alternative); and (3) a four-lane road with an align-
ment around the southern end of Boomer Lake and the park (the avoidance al-
ternative)."'' Finding ODOT's causeway alternative most "feasible," the
FHWA approved the second draft and granted ODOT federal funds for the
proposed road project.'75 Following the FHWA's approval, the Committee to
Preserve Boomer Lake Park ("Committee") was formed, and the proposed
road project became the subject of the Committee's efforts.'76
The construction was controversial because the City Commission elected
to cross the lake and park with the new road.'77 The project appropriated
roughly 3.3 acres of park-land and approximately 2.4 acres of Boomer Lake to
construct the causeway and bridge.'78 The Committee filed suit challenging
the project's funding.' The district court granted the Department of
Transportation's motion for summary judgment, s0 and the Committee ap-
pealed to the Tenth Circuit.
On appeal, the Committee claimed section 4(f) of the Transportation Act
was violated by the Federal Highway Administration. 8' The Committee
maintained that permitting federal monies to fund a highway project that en-
tailed destroying parkland violated the Act, and that there were alternatives
which could have been used without affecting the Park.8 2
b. Opinion of the Court
In affirming the district court's opinion, the Tenth Circuit applied the
three-pronged analysis promulgated by the Supreme Court in Overton
Park.'83 The Tenth Circuit held that the Secretary of Transportation acted
172. Id.
173. Id.
174. Id. The FHWA also issued a finding of no significant impact in accordance with NEPA.
For a discussion of NEPA, see supra note 70.
175. Boomer Lake, 4 F.3d at 1548.
176. Id. The Committee was made up of six residents of Stillwater living near Boomer Lake
Park. Id.
177. Id.
178. Id. at 1547. The court did note that the City of Stillwater furnished 3.3 acres of commen-
surate land on another lake for public recreational use to make up for the 3.3 acres of Boomer
Lake the construction project would relinquish. Id. at 1548 n.l.
179. The Committee's action challenged the federal funding of the road project in addition to
the FHWA's failure to prepare an environmental impact statement. Id. at 1548.
180. Id. The court held that under section 4(f) of the Transportation Act, alternatives to the
Lakeview Road highway decision conferred "uniquely difficult problems" such that the Federal
Highway Administration did not err in rejecting them. Id.
181. Id.
182. Id. at 1549, 1551.
183. See Overton Park, 401 U.S. at 415-17.
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within the scope of his authority under 4(f),' finding it reasonable for the
Secretary to conclude that alternatives to the highway project involved "unique
problems which rendered them imprudent."'83 While the Secretary failed to
consider an alternative such as a two-lane road that would have avoided taking
park-land,'86 and also failed to consider the potential use of existing roads
when he rejected the "no-build alternative,"'' 7 the court determined that both
options were incapable of "accommodating projected traffic volumes" and
therefore were inadequate.'88
Since the Department of Transportation failed to allege that the alternative
routes were not feasible, the court restricted its review to whether the alterna-
tives were imprudent.8 9 The court found that there were several reasons why
the suggested alternative routes were imprudent." Moreover, the causeway
alternative had several benefits that the other alternatives did not possess.'
It enhanced fishing access," it improved the quality of the water "by reduc-
ing the wind action on the lake"'93 and joined the east and west sides of the
park.
94
184. Boomer Lake, 4 F.3d at 1550.
185. The court explained that "Ithe inability of an alternative to accommodate future traffic
volumes is justification for rejecting [an] alternative." Id.; see also Hickory Neighborhood Defense
League v. Skinner, 910 F.2d 159, 164 (4th Cit. 1990) (explaining that alternatives which do not
solve or fulfill the "transportation needs of the project" may properly be rejected by the Secretary
as not prudent"); Eagle Foundation, 813 F.2d at 805 (indicating that an aggregate of modest
problems "may add up to a sufficient reason to use § 4(f) lands"). But see Overton Park, 401 U.S.
at 411-13, in which the Supreme Court stated:
[C]onsiderations of cost, directness of route, and community disruption ... [are not] on
an equal footing with preservation of parkland .... Congress clearly did not intend that
cost and disruption of the community were to be ignored by the Secretary, but the very
existence of the statutes.., indicates that protection of parkland was to be given para-
mount importance.
Id. (footnotes omitted).
186. Boomer Lake, 4 F.3d at 1551.
187. Id.
188. Id. at 1552.
189. Id. at 1550.
190. Id. For example, if an alternative could not "accommodate future traffic volumes," that is
sufficient for rejecting it as an alternative. Id. (citing Lake Hefner Open Space Alliance v. Dole,
871 F.2d 943, 947 (10th Cir. 1989)). Additionally, when an alternative route does not "satisfacto-
rily fulfill the purposes of the project... [it] may be rejected." Id. (citing Arizona Past & Future
Found., Inc. v. Lewis, 722 F.2d 1423, 1428 (9th Cir. 1983)). The court also cited Eagle Founda-
tion, 813 F.2d at 804, 810, for the proposition that safety and costs are valid aims to keep in mind
in rejecting alternative routes. Boomer Lake, 4 F.3d at 1550.
It was clear that the court accepted respondents several explanations as to why the alterna-
tives were not prudent. The Environmental Assessmentl/4(f) statement declared the avoidance route
problematic because it was found to have:
(1) higher road user costs; (2) more traffic congestion; (3) substandard curves which in
turn raised safety concerns; (4) failure to accommodate east-west traveling opportunities
as well as a direct route across the lake; (5) more intersection modifications on existing
roads; (6) more commercial and residential relocations; and (7) higher construction cost.
Id. The 4(f) statement also explained that "the no-build alternative, by failing to connect Lakeview
Road, was considered worst with respect to problems 1-4, and was thought to eliminate a vital
section line road that links the east and west sides of Stillwater." Id.
191. Boomer Lake, 4 F.3d at 1550.
192. Id.
193. Id. at 1550 n.5.
194. Id. at 1550.
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As to the first Overton Park inquiry,'95 the court held that it was rea-
sonable for the Secretary to believe that the alternative routes were impru-
dent.'96 Thus, it was within the scope of his authority to fund the highway
project through Boomer Lake Park.'97 The court reasoned that an alternative
may be forsaken if it does not effectuate the highway's original intentions.'
The second prong of the Overton Park test'"9 required the court to deter-
mine whether all relevant factors were considered in the Secretary's deci-
sion.' Rejecting the Committee's suggestion that the Secretary should have
considered a two-lane parkland avoidance alternative, the court held that "the
decision concerning which alternatives to consider is necessarily bounded by a
rule of reason and practicality." '' The court also noted that the Committee
did not explain why the two-lane alternative would have been better suited
than the four-lane alternative that was previously rejected.2 2 While reducing
harm to the park, the two-lane alternative would not serve projected traffic
volumes.2 3 This fact, alone, was a sufficient a reason to reject the
Committee's proposal.
The Committee made several other arguments against the 4(f) state-
ment."0 First, it argued that the Secretary did not consider existing roads as
an alternative no-build option.0" The court was convinced, however, that the
Secretary did consider some of the roads already in existence, °" and had
concluded that they were inadequate.0 7 The Committee did not submit evi-
dence to suggest otherwise.2 "0 Although the Secretary did not consider "all"
of the existing roads, the court, nevertheless, did not find the oversight arbi-
trary and capricious.2 "0
The Committee also alleged that bad faith was involved in the final 4(f)
statement.2 ' It argued that the Secretary increased the estimated cost of the
avoidance alternative in the final EA/4(f) statement.2" Judge Brorby agreed
with the district court, however, finding no evidence to support a bad faith
195. See supra note 156.
196. Boomer Lake, 4 F.3d at 1550.
197. Id.
198. Id.
199. See supra note 156.
200. Boomer Lake, 4 F.3d at 1551. The second prong essentially requires the court to consider
whether the Secretary made a clear error of judgment. Id. (citing Overton Park, 401 U.S. at 416).
201. Id.; see also Hickory, 910 F.2d at 164 (explaining that the record does not have to be
utterly complete, but instead the government must apply the "rule of reason and practicality").
202. Boomer Lake, 4 F.3d at 1551.
203. Id.
204. Id. at 1551-55.
205. Id. at 1551.
206. The court found the submitted environmental documents evidence of the Secretary's
consideration. Id. at 1551-52.
207. The record indicated that it was either unlikely existing roads could be widened into four
lanes or could not accommodate projected traffic volumes. Id.
208. Id.
209. Id. at 1552. While the failure to make such a consideration was relevant, it was not






Finally, the Committee alleged that: (1) the Secretary's decision was not
supported by the record;" 3 (2) the Secretary's decision was in violation of
the National Environmental Protection Act;2 4 and (3) the Secretary erred by
not filling out an Environmental Impact Statement ("EIS") and not issuing a
finding of no significant impact ("FONSI"). 2 5 The Tenth Circuit did not
give credence to any of the Committee's allegations, and in affirming the
district court, held that the Committee's claims were unsupported by the re-
cord.21 6
c. Analysis
In reviewing 4(f) determinations, courts are not entitled to substitute their
own judgment for the judgement of the Federal Highway Administration.2 7
The standard of review is very narrow.28 The court must consider the
FHWA's record the "focal point for judicial review.,
219
The legislative history of section 4(f) suggests that Congress intended to
preserve the nation's natural beauty through careful highway planning.22° Al-
though the Supreme Court in Overton Park construed 4(f) to mean that the
land must be preserved in all but the "most unusual situations, 221 courts
have found that several considerations can defeat the preservation of 4(f)
lands.222
Since Overton Park, courts have unconditionally questioned the possibility
of alternative routes in highway decision-making, ensuring highways are not
built through protected lands unless there are no other feasible and prudent
212. Id.
213. Id. at 1553. The Committee made this allegation to overrule the district court's granting
of summary judgment in favor of the respondents. The Tenth Circuit determined that no reason-
able juror could find the Secretary's determination arbitrary and capricious, and thus rejected the
Committee's claim. Id.
214. Id. at 1554 (citing 42 U.S.C. § 4332(2)(c) (1988 & Supp. V 1993)). The court explained
that NEPA obligates the agency to contemplate all environmental impacts of a proposed action
and guarantees that the agency will "inform the public that it has indeed considered environmental
concerns in its decision-making process." Id. (quoting Baltimore Gas & Elec. Co. v. NRDC, 462
U.S. 87, 97 (1983)). The Boomer Lake court then held that the Secretary did not violate NEPA
and was only required to consider possible environmental impacts in the decision process. Id.
215. The court held that the decision not to conduct an EIS and to issue a FONSI was best
left to the agency's expertise, and therefore, found that the Committee's final arguments failed. Id.
at 1555-56. The court concluded that the Committee's claims of adverse environmental effects
were at best speculative. Id. at 1556.
216. Id. at 1553-56.
217. Overton Park, 401 U.S. at 416; see also Citizens to Preserve Foster Park, Inc. v. Volpe,
466 F.2d 991, 995 (7th Cir. 1972) (explaining that the court is not "empowered to substitute its
judgment for that of the Secretary").
218. Overton Park, 401 U.S. at 416.
219. Camp v. Pitts, 411 U.S. 138, 142 (1973).
220. S. REP. No. 1340, 90th Cong., 2d Sess. 18 (1968), reprinted in 1968 U.S.C.C.A.N. 3482,
3500.
221. Overton Park, 401 U.S. at 411.
222. See supra note 185; see also Citizens Against Burlington, Inc. v. Busey, 938 F.2d 190,
197-98 (D.C. Cir. 1991) (finding that boosting a local economy is a reasonable consideration in
eliminating alternatives that would not accomplish that goal).
19951
DENVER UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW
alternatives.223  While the Tenth Circuit upheld the Federal Highway
Administration's decision to build a highway through Boomer Lake Park,224
the court made it clear that there were no reasonable alternatives to the pro-
posed highway. 5 While courts have vacillated in their approval of highway
construction through protected areas, 2 6 the common thread throughout the
circuits has been judicial deference to agency authority.227
Another commonality found in post-Overton Park 4(f) decisions is the
application of the Overton Park three-pronged analysis.228 While lower
courts are continually guided by this three-tiered inquiry, they have neverthe-
less taken liberty to expand their interpretations of 4(f).229 For example, it
has been held that land can be protected and highway projects may be rejected
if the land is "constructively" used in a transportation endeavor.230 Courts
identifying a constructive use of land have reduced Overton Park's three-
pronged inquiry to a two-step analysis. 3' This two-step standard considers:
"(1) the proximity of the harm to the property, and (2) the nature of the ef-
fects of the harm on the property's historic value or significance. 232 Other
lower courts have broadened 4(f) to include even minor uses of park land,233
or have applied 4(f) to protect archaeological sites.3
Section 4(f) has been very successful "in preserving numerous ... sites
and thousands of acres of public parkland. 3  While there is an undeniable
duty on the Secretary of Transportation to minimize harm to 4(f) land, the
Tenth Circuit's decision in Boomer Lake is suitable given its unique circum-
stances.236
223. Houck, supra note 148, at 482-83.
224. Boomer Lake, 4 F.3d at 1550.
225. Id.
226. See, e.g., Eagle Foundation, 813 F.2d at 810 (affirming decision to build highway
through 4(f) land); Coalition for Canyon Preservation v. Bowers, 632 F.2d 774, 784 (9th Cir.
1980) (holding that the Secretary had failed to contemplate all reasonable alternatives in making
his 4(f) determination, and therefore, the parkland would be spared); Stop H-3, 538 F. Supp. at
181 (holding that the Secretary's determination must be set aside because the Secretary failed to
consider alternatives which would minimize harm to the park).
227. Boomer Lake, 4 F.3d at 1549 (citing Overton Park, 401 U.S. at 415) (stating that "the
Secretary's decision is entitled to a presumption of regularity"); see also Eagle Foundation, 813
F.2d at 803 (stating that "deferential review ensures that once the court is satisfied that the Secre-
tary took a close look at the things that matter and made the hard decisions, those decisions
stick").
228. See supra note 155.
229. Roger Nober, Note, Federal Highways and Environmental Litigation: Toward a Theory
of Public Choice & Administrative Reaction, 27 HARv. J. ON LEGIs. 229, 249-50 (1990).
230. See, e.g., Allison v. Department of Transp., 908 F.2d 1024, 1028 (D.C. Cir. 1990) (stat-
ing that an escalation in noise levels is sufficient to create constructive use); Adler v. Lewis, 675
F.2d 1085, 1092 (9th Cir. 1982) (stating that physical taking is not required to constitute use).
231. Miller, supra note 137, at 646.
232. Id.
233. Township of Springfield v. Lewis, 702 F.2d 426, 430 (3d Cir. 1983) (explaining that
"[any park use, regardless of its degree invokes section 4(f)") (citing Louisiana Envtl. Soc'y v.
Coleman, 537 F.2d 79, 84 (5th Cir. 1976)).
234. See Stanley D. Olesh, Note, The Roads Through Our Ruins: Archaeology and Section
4(J) of the Department of Transportation Act, 28 WM. & MARY L. REv. 155, 163 (1986).
235. See Miller, supra note 137, at 636 n.13.
236. See Overton Park, 401 U.S. at 411 (stating that unique circumstances may include "con-




During the Tenth Circuit's survey period, the court handed down only a
handful of transportation law decisions. Both Issac and Boomer Lake illustrate
the considerable judicial deference given to agency decision-making, and the
Tenth Circuit's regard for the FAA's and Department of Transportation's
expertise. The court's use of the "substantial evidence" and "arbitrary and
capricious" standards illustrate its willingness to uphold agency action.
Cases involving airport and highway development have historically been
brought before courts to protest agency determinations. As with other transpor-
tation activities, the responsibility for airport improvement and development,
as well as highway decision-making, has been delegated to administrative
agencies, which are thought to be better equipped to deal with the details of
aviation and road construction. Various agencies are created by the legislature
to regulate transportation, and courts simply act as a check on the agencies
power. The common law has stretched to provide solutions for principles
previously not considered in the agencies' enabling acts, but for the most part,
the Tenth Circuit has continued to apply deferential standards to agency find-
ings.
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